Written by Ameya Pratap Singh
Even if the withdrawal begins in Pangong Tso, east Ladakh, it is important to reconsider the kind of diplomatic options India has relied on to resolve the ongoing border dispute with China and uncover what this is about the shifts in India abroad, politics is what it says.
When a military response was impractical, India has usually increased diplomatic pressure. This was often seen in response to Pakistan’s use of cross-border terrorism after 1998. For example, India has brought charges for a comprehensive convention on international terrorism at the United Nations. Strangely enough, however, similar international support to stigmatize Chinese aggression was not sought. Foreign Minister (EAM) S. Jaishankar’s speech at the 13th All India Conference of China Studies is instructive. The tenor was almost entirely bilateral (with an emphasis on mutual respect, sensitivity, and interests), and there was almost no effort to send a signal to audiences outside of India and China. No mention in particular of values or democracy.
This is puzzling for three reasons. First, aggression and territorial conquest violate perhaps the most fundamental norm of world politics in state sovereignty. So it shouldn’t be difficult to convince relevant third parties such as key Western or Indo-Pacific allies of the extent of the violation (think of sanctions against Russia for annexing Crimea in 2014). Second, contrary to popular belief, China cares a lot about its self-image as a non-belligerent. This is why the company invests so heavily in “image management” and has often used economic incentives to attract other countries (think of Xi’s recent speech in Davos). When India justified its nuclear tests in 1998 by highlighting China’s threat to its national security, Beijing was far more concerned about its classification as an attacker than about the increased risks of such a proliferation of nuclear weapons. With that in mind, it would really hate to lose face and be outed as a tyrant. Even after the 1962 war, the Chinese spent considerable diplomatic capital trying to convince the Colombo powers that they were acting in self-defense only. Third, China’s global reputation is already at an all-time low in the face of the COVID-19 outbreak (according to a survey by the Pew Research Center), possibly since the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989.
Why hasn’t India brought together major powers for its cause against China in a way that would cause the latter to lose face? It certainly preferred this strategy with Pakistan, and it did so with great effect. There can be a few possible explanations. Most glaringly, in attempting to build international pressure on the Chinese, concerns have been raised that the Modi regime’s domestic reputation as a government with an assertive foreign policy that is not afraid to project violence and power may be violated. This concern can of course also apply to the audience logic in Beijing. India has military supremacy with Pakistan. India is a far weaker power than China. The use of diplomatic pressure could be seen as a sign of India’s weakness and inability to militarily deter the PLA.
Another reason may be the limitations of collective action in international relations. What if India’s diplomatic efforts were simply ignored? This would burst the bubble of the pretext that India has de facto alliances and expose its efforts to offset an outside mirage. This could lead to the isolation of a weak looking India, with China being more antagonistic. While the QUAD has received much rhetorical fanfare as a counterbalance to Chinese hegemony, serious doubts remain about its practical utility. Virtual summits and naval exercises are no substitute for direct and consistent diplomatic pressure from global leaders. Fearing isolation, even the dogmatic Mao Zedong directed his foreign policy towards peaceful coexistence in the early 1950s. Although the recently concluded EU-China investment agreement has shown the limits of collective action against Chinese warfare, EU leaders have raised at least muted objections to China’s human rights record. No concerns were raised about China’s lack of respect for the sovereignty of its neighbors, who are also European partners (this should mean the status quo on a disputed border). The United States’ renunciation of global leadership under the Trump regime has wreaked havoc on that front. It will take time for the Biden administration to restore America’s global reputation.
Finally, it is not clear whether India has overcome its persistent reluctance to involve other powers in its bilateral affairs, as alliances usually come with restrictions on sovereignty. It is entirely possible that India continues to view China as an inevitable partner for the “rise of Asia” and therefore wishes to develop this relationship independently of outside aid. Minister Jaishankar underlined in his aforementioned speech that China’s “outstanding position in the world order” [was] Of course; and in the last few decades, if at all [had] only this increased awareness ”.
While these factors could prevent India’s pursuit of a diplomatic offensive so far, New Delhi may wish to reconsider its position. A great cycle of normative changes is underway. Old rules are being renegotiated in order to adapt them to the current circumstances, in particular to deal with the threats posed by the rise of China. At this moment India must revive the norm of territorial sovereignty as the basis of any future regional order in the Indo-Pacific. Let us remember that the potential threat from Chinese aggression affects many more Indo-Pacific states such as Taiwan, Australia, Japan, ASEAN, Nepal and Bhutan, as well as other major Western powers involved in the region. Can’t these states unite and take collective action against violators of territorial sovereignty? Not only would this serve their self-interest, but post-colonial histories should also make them particularly apt to appreciate the importance of this norm. In addition, India lacks good military options against a Chinese fait accompli on the border in the short to medium term. Other Indo-Pacific states are not isolated either. If they are able to form a consensus-driven grouping that can agree on a common minimum collective bargaining program with China, this may be the best alternative. Other broader concerns such as the weapon of interdependence on trade or water can also be added to the mandate of such a grouping.
It is time China’s Indo-Pacific neighbors view their security as part of a broader regional safety net and recognize the role that collective sanctions, gentle balancing, and stigma can play in restraining China’s behavior as a great power. As a result, India’s region-building efforts should focus on the creation of institutions that enable such collective bargaining and also help reduce regional dependence on China (to limit its options for coercion). a kind of institutional protection. Before an Asian NATO, the Indo-Pacific needs its own rules-based order with territorial sovereignty at the center.
The author is reading for a DPhil in Area Studies (South Asia) at the University of Oxford. He would like to thank Professor Kate Sullivan de Estrada for her comments
